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QUICK, STOP HIRING OLD PEOPLE! HOW THE 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT OPENED THE DOOR FOR 
DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES UNDER THE 
ADEA 
Samantha Pitsch* 
Abstract: Do not discriminate against older persons. It seems like a simple mandate. 
However, the statute creating that mandate, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), has been anything but simple to implement. The details of the ADEA—who can 
bring a claim, and what kind of claim they can bring—have been extensively litigated since its 
inception. In 2016, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, decided that an employer could 
discriminate against older applicants by having a policy of not hiring people who have been 
out of college for a certain number of years, or who have a certain number of years of work 
experience. This has created a rift within that circuit and is a departure from the governing 
agency’s interpretation. This Comment explores the case law and legislative history leading 
up to the critical Eleventh Circuit case, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., which 
addresses the following question: can applicants for employment bring disparate impact claims 
under the ADEA? This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should hold that the ADEA 
does cover applicants for employment making disparate impact claims and that arbitrary age-
based hiring policies are discriminatory. Regardless of any Supreme Court decision on the 
question, this Comment also suggests that Congress should amend the ADEA to include 
language that would allow applicants for employment to bring disparate impact claims, 
bringing the ADEA in line with Title VII. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a business owner is looking to hire new employees. The owner 
hires a recruiting firm to help choose from all of the applications received. 
Ideally, the business owner would like someone to bring in new and fresh 
ideas to the business. In the pursuit of this goal, the business owner asks 
the firm reviewing the applications not to consider any applicants who 
have been out of college for more than five years or have five years of 
experience. This requirement could be seen as discriminating against an 
employee based on age. It may not be intentional discrimination because 
the business is not directly stating that it will not hire persons of a certain 
age, but it would disparately impact certain age groups and therefore could 
be discriminatory.1 Under existing disparate impact law, it should follow 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank 
Professor Eric Schnapper for his thoughtful input on this topic. I would also like to thank the entire 
Washington Law Review for tirelessly working with me on this piece.  
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that businesses could not lawfully maintain these policies. Surprisingly, 
in 2016 the Eleventh Circuit decided, en banc, that employers could 
discriminate based on age if the person being discriminated against was 
an applicant for employment and not yet an actual employee.2 In its 
decision, the court held that ADEA protection does not cover an applicant 
for employment;3 therefore, policies of hiring only people who have been 
out of college for a certain amount of time with certain amounts of work 
experience are legal. The court’s determination is surprising given that it 
was based on a statute that was created to protect older persons from 
discrimination in the workplace.4 Is the Eleventh Circuit correct in its 
interpretation of the ADEA? This Comment argues that the court is 
mistaken and that the ADEA does in fact cover applicants for 
employment. Additionally, this Comment suggests that Congress should 
amend the ADEA to include the terms “or applicants for employment” to 
make it explicitly clear that the law covers applicants for employment. 
Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, three years after passing Title VII, 
the federal law prohibiting discrimination against employees on the basis 
of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.5 After requesting a study 
from the Secretary of Labor,6 Congress recognized a trend of businesses 
neither hiring nor promoting older persons.7 Congress passed the ADEA 
to combat this trend and to ease older persons’ abilities to get and maintain 
jobs.8 The ADEA has two sections forbidding discrimination by an 
employer.9 First, section 4(a)(1)10 of the ADEA makes it unlawful for an 
                                                     
1. See infra section II.B. 
2. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
3. Id.  
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967); id. § 623(a) (“It shall be 
unlawful for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age; or (3) to reduce 
the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.”). 
5. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602; see also 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66. 
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265. 
7. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 631 (older persons being defined in the statute as 
those who are forty or older). 
8. Id. § 621. 
9. Id. § 623(a)(1)–(2). 
10. In referring to sections of the ADEA, courts generally cite the original sections of the Act. 
However, the Act was also codified into the U.S. Code. Therefore, this Comment will vary between 
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employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s age.”11 Second, section 4(a)(2) states that an employer 
may not “limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s age.”12 
Under these two sections, the ADEA covers two different types of 
claims: disparate treatment and disparate impact.13 The first type, 
disparate treatment, allows plaintiffs to make claims of intentional 
discrimination against an employer.14 The second type was recognized in 
2005, when the Supreme Court held that section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA also 
allows employees to bring disparate impact claims.15 Disparate impact 
claims focus on employment policies that impact one group of people 
more than others and do not require a court to find intent on behalf of the 
employer.16 One question left unresolved by Congress and the Supreme 
Court, however, is whether applicants for employment are also eligible to 
make disparate impact claims. 
Since its passage in 1967, courts have struggled to determine who is 
eligible to bring claims under the ADEA and on what grounds. In search 
of guidance, courts have largely looked to Title VII cases due to the 
statute’s similar language and intent.17 The courts have also turned to the 
language of the ADEA, its legislative history, and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) interpretation of the Act when 
deciding what types of claims can be made under the ADEA.18 Although 
the Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on the question of whether the 
ADEA covers applicants for employment making disparate impact 
claims, several Supreme Court decisions illuminate the contours of the 
statute and the breadth of its coverage.19 Additionally, several circuit 
                                                     
citing to the original Act sections and the U.S. Code. 
11. Id. § 623(a)(1). 
12. Id. § 623(a)(2). 
13. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 237, 240 (2005). 
14. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36, n.15 (1977). 
15. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
16. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36, n.15. 
17. See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 233. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. Smith, 544 U.S. at 228; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (many 
courts look to Griggs’ interpretation of Title VII to understand the identical language in the ADEA). 
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courts have also grappled with questions related to the ADEA.20 In 2010 
a Georgia plaintiff, Richard M. Villarreal, brought a case that forced the 
district court to specifically deal with the issue of whether applicants for 
employment could make disparate impact claims.21 Mr. Villarreal brought 
a disparate impact claim under section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA claiming age 
discrimination.22 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit in an en banc decision 
ruled against Mr. Villarreal, holding that applicants cannot make disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA.23 
Mr. Villarreal petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari in February 
2017.24 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in June 2017.25 However, 
given the lack of clarity in the statute, this issue is likely to appear before 
the Court again. If the issue is appealed to the Supreme Court, this 
Comment argues that the Court should hold the ADEA covers applicants 
for employment with valid disparate impact claims. Like the Eleventh 
Circuit’s original decision,26 the Supreme Court will likely find that the 
statute is ambiguous and that case law does not clarify the language. If so, 
the Court should then look to the interpretation of the governing agency, 
the EEOC, which already recognizes disparate impact claims by 
applicants for employment.27 Regardless of any potential Supreme Court 
decision, this Comment also asserts that Congress should clarify the 
language of the ADEA to include applicants for employment in order to 
further realize the purpose of the statute—stopping employment 
discrimination against persons over the age of forty.28 
                                                     
20. See infra section IV.C. 
21. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 823055, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 
839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), aff’d and remanded to 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), and aff’d 15-
10602, 2017 WL 2781522 (11th Cir. June 27, 2017). 
22. Id. at *3; see also Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (section 4(a)(2) allows for disparate impact claims 
under the ADEA). 
23. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., __U.S.__, 137 S. 
Ct. 2292 (2017) (No. 16-971). 
25. Villarreal, 137 S. Ct. 2292. 
26. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1292–93, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 15-10602, 2016 WL 
635800, and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292. 
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (2012). 
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1967) (“It is therefore the 
purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; 
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of 
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”). 
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Part II of this Comment discusses the creation of the ADEA and the 
types of claims covered under the statute. It first addresses the legislative 
history that led to the creation of the statute. Next, it reviews what a 
disparate impact claim is and how that type of claim differs from a 
disparate treatment claim. In Part III, this Comment discusses the multiple 
methods of statutory interpretation available to courts, as well as the 
specific methods courts use to interpret ADEA and Title VII claims. 
Courts start their interpretation by deciding whether the language of the 
ADEA is ambiguous and then generally move from legislative history to 
look at how the governing agency—in this case the EEOC—treats the 
issues. Part IV of this Comment discusses the pertinent case law related 
to the ADEA. It first discusses early Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
the relevant portions of Title VII29 as well as cases interpreting the 
ADEA.30 Part IV then assesses circuit court cases that, at least in dicta, 
discuss whether applicants for employment can make disparate impact 
claims. This Part delves into the first case that forced the Court to 
determine whether applicants for employment are able to bring disparate 
impact claims: Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.31 Each step of the 
case is addressed—from the district court, to the court of appeals, to the 
court of appeals en banc—to show how the different courts ruled on the 
issue. In Part V, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court should hold 
that the ADEA does cover disparate impact claims by applicants for 
employment when next given the opportunity. Finally, this Comment 
concludes that regardless of a Supreme Court decision on the issue, 
Congress should amend the statute to include the phrase “or applicants for 
employment” to solidify applicants’ abilities to bring suit under the 
ADEA in the future. 
I. THE ADEA WAS CREATED TO STOP DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 
In 1967, Congress passed the ADEA.32 Since its passage, litigants have 
brought a myriad of actions to the courts raising questions regarding the 
ADEA. Like its counterpart, Title VII, the ADEA has worked its way 
                                                     
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424 (1971). 
30. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 228 (2005). 
31. No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 823055, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2013), rev’d and 
remanded, 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 15-10602, 2016 
WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), aff’d and 
remanded, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), and aff’d 15-10602, 2017 WL 2781522 (11th Cir. June 27, 
2017). 
32. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 623. 
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through the court system in a quest to determine Congress’s exact 
meaning.33 Many courts have yet to resolve the issue of whether 
applicants for employment are able to make disparate impact claims under 
the ADEA. Reviewing the ADEA’s background and understanding 
disparate impact claims can instruct how the Supreme Court should 
answer the question. 
A. Legislative History and Purpose 
The impetus to create the ADEA was Congress’s passage of Title VII. 
The purpose of both statutes is to limit discrimination. The ADEA was 
fashioned to cover a class that Title VII did not: older persons. 
Congressional efforts to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment began in the mid-1950s.34 In 1964, the House and Senate 
even offered amendments codifying a prohibition against age 
discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.35 In the end, 
however, these amendments were opposed on the grounds that Congress 
did not have enough information to make a decision on the issue of age 
discrimination.36 In order to more fully understand the issue, Congress 
directed the Secretary of Labor to “make a full and complete study of the 
factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment 
because of age and of the consequences of such discrimination on the 
economy and individuals affected.”37 In 1965, the Secretary of Labor, W. 
Willard Wirtz, presented his report to Congress entitled, “The Older 
American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment.”38 The report 
documented the existence of age discrimination in the workplace, and it 
also concluded that this discrimination often stemmed from inaccurate 
stereotypes about older workers’ declining abilities and productivity.39 
In 1966, Congress responded by directing the Secretary to propose 
remedial legislation to address age discrimination.40 On January 23, 1967, 
                                                     
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. See 113 CONG. REC. 2199–2200 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT ACT 64–65 (1981) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
35. 110 CONG. REC. 2596–99, 9911–13, 13490–92 (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 34, at 5–14. 
36. Id. 
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265. 
38. SEC’Y OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
(1965), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 34, at 16–41. 
39. Id. at 22–23. 
40. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80 Stat. 830, 845. 
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the Secretary sent a letter to Congress proposing legislation entitled “Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.”41 Building on this 
recommendation, and on independent studies by committees in both the 
House and Senate,42 Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967.43 The stated 
purpose of the Act is to “promote employment of older persons based on 
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting 
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”44 
B. Disparate Impact Claims Under the ADEA 
The ADEA creates a cause of action for both disparate treatment and 
disparate impact claims.45 Disparate treatment occurs when an “employer 
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, 
color, religion [or other protected characteristics]. Proof of discriminatory 
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the 
mere fact of differences in treatment.”46 Plaintiffs can make disparate 
treatment claims through section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA, which requires 
discriminatory intent.47 This is because the emphasis in section 4(a)(1) is 
on how the employer acted toward the employee.48 
Disparate impact claims, by contrast, “involve employment practices 
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in 
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified 
by business necessity.”49 Proof of a discriminatory motive is not required 
                                                     
41. Letter from the Secretary of Labor to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President of the Senate (Jan. 23, 1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 34, at 62–63. 
42. See S. REP. No. 90-723 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 34, at 105–16; 
H.R. REP. No. 90-805 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 34, at 74–85; S. REP. 
No. 90-169 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 34, at 58–59. 
43. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602. 
44. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1967). 
45. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005). 
46. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). 
47. Smith, 544 U.S. at 248–49 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[F]or to take an action against an 
individual ‘because of such individual’s age’ is to do so ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of’ her age.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
48. Id. at 236 n.6 (“[T]he focus of the [section] is on the employer’s action with respect to the 
targeted individual.”); see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 623(a)(1) (an employer may 
not “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s age”). 
49. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
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under a disparate impact theory.50 Disparate impact is only addressed in 
section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, because section 4(a)(2) targets the results of 
an employer’s conduct and not the motive: 
Unlike in paragraph (a)(1), there is . . . an incongruity between 
the employer’s actions—which are focused on his employees 
generally—and the individual employee who adversely suffers 
because of those actions. Thus, an employer who classifies his 
employees without respect to age may still be liable under the 
terms of this paragraph if such classification adversely affects the 
employee because of that employee’s age—the very definition of 
disparate impact.51 
The Supreme Court first articulated the standard for analyzing disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA in Smith v. City of Jackson.52 To establish 
a prima facie case, a plaintiff is “responsible for isolating and identifying 
the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any 
observed statistical disparities.”53 
An employer can avoid liability by showing that any discrimination 
was based on a Reasonable Factor Other than Age (“RFOA”).54 Unlike 
the mandate of Title VII,55 it is not unlawful for an employer “to take any 
action otherwise prohibited under subsection[] (a) . . . where age is a bona 
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based 
on reasonable factors other than age.”56 The RFOA exception appears to 
apply equally to both types of claims under the ADEA, but the Supreme 
Court has stated that in “most disparate-treatment cases, if an employer in 
fact acted on a factor other than age, the action would not be prohibited 
under subsection (a) in the first place.”57 The Court concluded that it is 
                                                     
50. Id. 
51. Smith, 544 U.S. at 236 n.6; id. at 236 (“Thus the text focuses on the effects of the action on the 
employee rather than the motivation for the action of the employer.” (emphasis in original)). 
52. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
53. Id. at 241 (emphasis in original) (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 
(1988)); Carla J. Rozycki & Emma J. Sullivan, Disparate-Impact Claims Under the ADEA, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (Sept. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2011/september/disparate_ 
impact_claims_adea.html [https://perma.cc/DX22-J6GB]. 
54. Smith, 544 U.S. at 241; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1967). 
55. Smith, 544 U.S. at 229 (“Congress’ decision to limit the ADEA’s coverage by including the 
RFOA provision is consistent with the fact that age, unlike Title VII’s protected classifications, not 
uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity to engage in certain types of employment.”). 
56. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 623(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
57. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (“[T]here 
is no disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature 
other than the employee’s age.”)). 
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“in cases involving disparate-impact claims that the RFOA provision 
plays its principal role by precluding liability if the adverse impact was 
attributable to a nonage factor that was ‘reasonable.’”58 
II. METHODS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION USED IN 
ADEA CASE LAW 
When faced with a legal question regarding the interpretation of a 
statute, courts often look to different methods of statutory analysis.59 In 
relation to the ADEA, courts have relied on several specific methods of 
statutory interpretation. First, courts interpreting the ADEA look at the 
text of the statute.60 If the language is found to be ambiguous, or more 
justification is warranted, courts then look to case law, the context of the 
statute being interpreted,61 the legislative history,62 and the purpose of the 
statute.63 Courts also look to the governing agency interpretation of a 
given statute, if any exists, for guidance.64 
A court interpreting a statute first looks to the text of the statute.65 If 
the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, “that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”66 To that end, every word 
and provision should be given a meaning so as to not cause duplication or 
to cause a word or provision to have no consequence.67 If “[a] word or 
phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text[,]” then 
“a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.”68 
Because courts must also construe words in a way to give meaning to 
the other words in the statute, courts also look at the broader context of 
                                                     
58. Id. at 239. 
59. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
60. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
61. Id. 
62. Smith, 544 U.S. at 232–33. 
63. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971). 
64. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g en 
banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
65. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981) (“[T]he starting point in every case involving 
construction of a statute is the language itself.” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))). 
66. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
67. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 59, at 174). 
68. Id. (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 59, at 170). 
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the text.69 The Supreme Court held that “Congress generally acts 
intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute 
but omits it in another.”70 This applies with particular force where the 
words or phrases are in close proximity.71 Therefore, “deliberate variation 
in terminology within the same sentence of a statute suggests that 
Congress did not interpret the two terms as being equivalent.”72 
Courts have also looked to the legislative history of the ADEA and 
compared it to the amendments and the language of Title VII.73 The 
Supreme Court has stated that it could not “ignore Congress’s decision to 
amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the 
ADEA.”74 However, there are a plethora of reasons why Congress may or 
may not have amended a statute.75 Therefore, although some courts find 
legislative history to be instructive, other courts still find that questions 
remain after looking at the legislative history.76 
Relatedly, courts also look to legislative purpose to understand the 
meaning and scope of a statute.77 Although courts generally follow the 
presumption that “‘identical words used in different parts of the same act 
are intended to have the same meaning’ . . . the presumption ‘is not rigid’ 
and ‘the meaning of the same words may vary to meet the purposes of the 
law.’”78 This interpretive canon is tempered, however, by the notion that 
the court’s “job is to follow the text even if doing so will supposedly 
‘undercut a basic objective of the statute.’”79 “Strong evidence” therefore 
                                                     
69. Id. at 963; Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity 
of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which 
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”). 
70. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015); see also Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (“Where Congress uses certain language 
in one part of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally.”). 
71. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919. 
72. United States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). 
73. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 978–79 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). 
74. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009). 
75. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Congress 
has all kinds of reasons for passing laws, and presumably all kinds of reasons for not passing laws as 
well.”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 
2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
76. See infra section III.D.2. 
77. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 253 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
78. United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 (2001) (citing Atlantic 
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)). 
79. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 969 (citing Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, __ U.S. __, 135 S. 
Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015)); see also Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Even if a 
statute’s legislative history evinces an intent contrary to its straightforward statutory command, ‘we 
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is necessary to prove that Congress intended words to be read with a 
certain purpose.80 
When a court finds a statute to be ambiguous, judges turn to the agency 
that enforces the statute to see if it has dealt with the ambiguity.81 This 
approach recognizes the theory that “a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an 
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory 
gaps.”82 If the agency has interpreted the statute, and that interpretation is 
reasonable, the court can defer to that interpretation.83 Courts have 
emphasized, however, that the statute must be ambiguous before turning 
to an agency interpretation.84 
In sum, courts use a variety of tools to interpret contested statutes. 
When interpreting the ADEA in particular, courts have generally relied 
on the tools above.85 These decisions also show that although there is no 
rule on which tools must be used, analysis must begin with the text of the 
statute.86 
III. PERTINENT CASE LAW FOR ADEA CLAIMS 
In Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,87 the Eleventh Circuit, en 
banc, held that the section of the ADEA allowing disparate impact claims 
does not apply to job applicants.88 The underpinning of the decision 
                                                     
do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.’” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994))). 
80. Smith, 544 U.S. at 260–61 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
81. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g 
en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017); see, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”). 
82. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (citing Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 844); Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1299 (“When a statute is ambiguous, policy choices belong to 
the agency that enforces the statute.” (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005))). 
83. See King v. Burwell, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015); EEOC v. Commercial Office 
Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, 
for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical or any 
other standards. Rather, the EEOC’s interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable 
to be entitled to deference.” (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761 (1979))); 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
84. See, e.g., Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 970 (en banc) (“[W]e do not defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute when the text is clear.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292. 
85. See infra Part III. 
86. See id. 
87. 839 F.3d 958 (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292. 
88. Id. at 961 (“We conclude that the whole text of the Act makes clear that an applicant for 
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stemmed from two Supreme Court decisions: Griggs v. Duke Power Co.89 
and Smith v. City of Jackson.90 Three circuit courts have also ruled on 
whether applicants may make disparate impact claims.91 The Supreme 
Court has not directly ruled on this issue yet, but if it does, it will likely 
review these cases. 
A. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
In Griggs, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited an employer from requiring 
a high school diploma or passage of an intelligence test “as a condition of 
employment in or transfer to jobs.”92 The suit was brought by a group of 
African American employees against Duke Power Company.93 In a recent 
decision interpreting the ADEA, the Supreme Court stated the 
“interpretation of § 703(a)(2) of Title VII in Griggs is . . . a precedent of 
compelling importance.”94 The Court explained that “[e]xcept for 
substitution of the word ‘age’ for the words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin,’ the language of that provision in the ADEA is identical 
to that found in section 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII).”95 Courts therefore first turn to Griggs when analyzing an ADEA 
claim.96 
In Griggs, the petitioners’ case related to two policies enforced by 
Duke Power Company. The first policy was introduced in 1955, when the 
company began requiring a high school education for initial assignment 
to company departments, excluding the labor department (the lowest paid 
department).97 In 1965, the company introduced an additional requirement 
that new employees register “satisfactory scores” on two professionally 
prepared aptitude tests to qualify for placement in a department.98 
                                                     
employment cannot sue an employer for disparate impact because the applicant has no ‘status as an 
employee.’” (quoting Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1967))). 
89. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
90. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
91. See infra section IV.C. 
92. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26. 
93. Id. at 426. 
94. Smith, 544 U.S. at 234. 
95. Id. at 233. 
96. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g 
en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
97. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427. 
98. Id. at 428. 
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The district court and the court of appeals both decided that there “was 
no showing of a racial purpose or invidious intent in the adoption” of the 
requirements.99 The court of appeals held that, in the absence of a 
discriminatory purpose, the requirements instituted by the company did 
not violate the Civil Rights Act.100 The Supreme Court disagreed. The 
Supreme Court held that “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their 
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they 
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices.”101 The Court further stated that “good intent or absence of 
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing 
mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and 
are unrelated to measuring job capability.”102 The Court recognized that 
Congress intended the Civil Rights Act to address “the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation[s]” behind them.103 In 
recognizing this, the Court “held that the plain text of § 703(a)(2) of Title 
VII . . . authorized disparate impact liability” claims.104 
Courts disagree as to whether Griggs applies to cases brought by 
applicants for employment.105 In 1977, the Supreme Court discussed the 
Griggs opinion when ruling on a Title VII discrimination case.106 Citing 
Griggs, the Court held that to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, “a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral 
standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly 
discriminatory pattern.”107 In 2015, the Supreme Court again alluded to 
the fact that a plaintiff could make a disparate impact claim like in Griggs 
in cases concerning hiring criterions.108 The Court held “that in a 
disparate-impact case, § 703(a)(2) does not prohibit hiring criteria with a 
                                                     
99. Id. at 429. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 430. 
102. Id. at 432. 
103. Id. (emphasis in original). 
104. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g 
en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
105. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 968 (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292. 
106. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). 
107. Id. 
108. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2517 (2015). 
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‘manifest relationship’ to job performance.”109 Several circuit courts have 
also held that Griggs could be applied to applicants for employment.110 
Other courts do not extend the argument from Griggs beyond claims 
brought by current employees. In Villarreal, the Court of Appeals en 
banc’s majority opinion reasoned that many of the cases characterizing 
Griggs as applying to applicants to employment were adjudicated after 
Title VII was amended in 1972.111 Arguably, the courts deciding those 
cases were not focused on the question of whether or not Griggs applied 
to applicants because the statute already applied to them.112 Additionally, 
the plaintiffs in Griggs were already employees.113 Thus, the case did not 
even deal with the question of whether applicants for employment were 
included under Title VII.114 Several Supreme Court cases have also 
described Griggs as having a limited application to employees or 
transferees. In 1975, the Supreme Court described Griggs as only 
addressing transferees.115 In a later opinion, the Supreme Court instead 
focused on the fact that Griggs was brought by employees of the Duke 
Power Company.116 Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have waffled in its 
choice of words when describing Griggs. As such, it is difficult to say 
whether the Griggs precedent extends only to current employees and 
transferees or also includes applicants for employment. 
                                                     
109. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). 
110. See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1279 n.16 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In 
Griggs . . . the plaintiffs showed that the objective and facially neutral requirements . . . in order to be 
hired or transferred . . . had a disproportionate effect on white and black applicants.”); id. at 1282 n.18 
(“For example in Griggs the Supreme Court made clear that Title VII prohibited an employer from 
using neutral hiring and promotion practices.”); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Synthetic 
Rubber Plant, 491 F.2d 1364, 1373 n.25 (5th Cir. 1974) (“No test for hiring or promotion is valid if 
it ‘operates to exclude Negroes (and) cannot be shown to be related to job performance.’” (quoting 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431)); United States v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 911 (5th Cir. 1973) (in 
Griggs, “the Supreme Court held that the proviso of this section means that no test used for hiring or 
promotion is valid if it ‘operates to exclude Negroes [and] cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance’”). 
111. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 968–69 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). The 1972 amendment added the words “or applicant to 
employment” to Title VII. See infra note 201. 
112. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 969. 
113. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426. 
114. See, e.g., Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 969. 
115. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 (1975) (“The concept of job relatedness 
takes on meaning from the facts of the Griggs case. A power company in North Carolina had reserved 
its skilled jobs for whites prior to 1965. Thereafter, the company allowed Negro workers to transfer 
to skilled jobs, but all transferees—white and Negro—were required to attain national median scores 
on two tests.” (emphasis added)). 
116. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (“Prior to the enactment of Title VII, the Duke 
Power Co. restricted its black employees to the labor department.” (emphasis added)). 
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B. Smith v. City of Jackson 
In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court settled the conflicting 
case law that developed after Griggs.117 The conflict arose after the 
Supreme Court ruled on an ADEA case, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.118 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that where an employer takes action 
based on a reasonable factor other than age, there is no violation of the 
ADEA.119 Although the Court in Griggs maintained that Title VII allowed 
for disparate impact claims,120 the Hazen Paper opinion held that 
disparate treatment claims “capture[d] the essence of what Congress 
sought to prohibit in the ADEA.”121 Thus, the Hazen Paper Court left the 
question open as to the availability of disparate impact claims under the 
ADEA, stating: “we have never decided whether a disparate impact theory 
of liability is available under the ADEA . . . and we need not do so 
here.”122 Several lower courts subsequently expressed confusion as to 
whether the ADEA allowed for disparate impact claims.123 The decision 
in Smith, then, answered the question of whether the disparate impact 
theory of liability announced in Griggs is cognizable under the ADEA.124 
Smith began when police and public safety officers of Jackson, 
Mississippi alleged that the plan to increase the salaries of city employees 
violated the ADEA.125 On October 1, 1998, the City of Jackson “adopted 
a pay plan granting raises to all City employees.”126 In a 1999 revision of 
the plan, all police officers and police dispatchers were granted raises.127 
                                                     
117. 544 U.S. 228, 237–38 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
118. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
119. Id. at 609. 
120. See supra section IV.A. 
121. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610. 
122. Id. 
123. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 237 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“It was only after our 
decision in [Hazen Paper] that some of those courts concluded that the ADEA did not authorize a 
disparate-impact theory of liability.”); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 
2003) (discussing the debate among the courts of appeals in interpreting both Griggs and Hazen 
Paper), aff’d on other grounds, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
124. Smith, 544 U.S. at 232 (“We . . . now hold that the ADEA does authorize recovery in 
‘disparate-impact’ cases comparable to Griggs.”); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive 
Cmtys. Project, Inc., __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015) (“Together, Griggs holds and the 
plurality in Smith instructs that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-
impact claims when their text refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of 
actors, and where that interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose.”). 
125. Smith, 544 U.S. at 230. 
126. Id. at 231. 
127. Id. 
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In this revision, officers and dispatchers who had been there fewer than 
five years received “proportionally greater raises” than those with “more 
seniority.”128 Consequently, a group of older officers filed suit under the 
ADEA.129 The officers alleged the facts of both a disparate treatment 
claim—that the City deliberately discriminated against them because of 
their age—as well as a disparate impact claim—that they were adversely 
affected by the plan because of their age.130 
The district court hearing the case granted summary judgment to the 
City on both the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.131 The 
court of appeals held that the decision on the disparate treatment claim 
was premature and remanded the issue back to the district court.132 
However, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment on the disparate 
impact claim, holding “that the ADEA was not intended to remedy age-
disparate effects that arise from the application of employment plans or 
practices that are not based on age.”133 Upon appeal, however, the 
Supreme Court held that both the ADEA and Title VII authorize recovery 
on a disparate impact theory.134 The Court stated that the only difference 
between the two statutes is that “the scope of disparate-impact liability 
under ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.”135 Thus, the Court 
recognized that disparate impact claims are available but are limited to 
section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.136 
The Smith opinion, therefore, allows for disparate impact claims but 
does not answer the question of whether job applicants can bring disparate 
impact claims.137 Several courts have looked to Justice O’Connor’s 






133. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 544 U.S. 
228 (2005). 
134. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. The Court held that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims. 
Id. However, the opinion becomes a plurality when discussing which statutory interpretation correctly 
comes to that conclusion. Id. at 229. In a concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that the ADEA should 
authorize disparate impact claims solely because the EEOC interprets the statute in that way. Id. at 
242 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
135. Id. at 240. 
136. Id. at 236 n.6 (there are “key textual differences between [section] 4(a)(1), which does not 
encompass disparate-impact liability, and [section] 4(a)(2)”); see supra section II.B. 
137. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Because 
Smith involved only claims of current employees, it did not answer the question we face here: whether 
job applicants may bring disparate impact claims as well.”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 
15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 
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concurrence in Smith as a guide for answering that question.138 In her 
concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas, Justice 
O’Connor stated “[s]ection 4(a)(2), of course, does not apply to 
‘applicants for employment’ at all—it is only [section] 4(a)(1) that 
protects this group.”139 However, other courts have found Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence to be unpersuasive or inconclusive.140 Without a 
more binding precedent, and given that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 
argued the ADEA should not allow disparate impact claims at all, the 
Smith case alone does not answer whether applicants can make disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA.141 
C. Other Circuits Weigh In 
Three other circuits have discussed the issue of whether applicants for 
employment can make disparate impact claims. The cases in these circuits 
were decided before the Supreme Court decision in Smith.142 Despite this, 
they are still worth considering for several reasons. First, the decisions 
specifically touch upon the applicability of section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA 
in the context of an applicant for employment. Second, they are indicative 
of broadly applicable approaches to the issues. The arguments used by the 
courts to deny coverage to applicants for employment in these cases are 
still used when discussing the issue today. 
In 1994, the Seventh Circuit held in EEOC v. Francis W. Parker 
School143 that the ADEA did not cover disparate impact claims—
regardless of the plaintiff’s status as an employee or applicant.144 The 
majority decision focused on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazen 
Paper, in which the Supreme Court expressly recognized only the 
                                                     
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
138. See, e.g., id. at 1309–10 (Vinson, J., dissenting); Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 969 (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292. 
139. Smith, 544 U.S. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
140. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1296 n.4 (“[T]here is dicta in a binding opinion and there is dicta in a 
nonbinding concurrence. It’s one thing to abide by dicta that is ‘three long, citation-laden paragraphs’ 
of ‘well thought out, thoroughly reasoned, and carefully articulated analysis’ in a majority opinion, 
as Schwab did . . . . It’s another to do the same for a single sentence in a minority opinion.” (quoting 
Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006))). 
141. Id. 
142. Smith, 544 U.S. at 228 (decided in 2005). 
143. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994). 
144. Id. at 1077 (“[R]eliance on Title VII jurisprudence . . . seems inappropriate on the facts of 
this case. [The dissent] concludes that because Title VII’s prohibitions mirror those of the ADEA and 
Title VII permits disparate impact relief, ‘similar acceptance in ADEA cases’ is required.”). 
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elements of a disparate treatment claim.145 The circuit court, in dicta, also 
emphasized the difference between Title VII and the ADEA. It specified 
that because the “‘mirror’ provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, 
[the language of Title VII providing coverage for] ‘applicants for 
employment,’” the ADEA does not cover applicants for employment.146 
The court stated, “[i]n light of the ADEA’s nearly verbatim adoption of 
Title VII language, the exclusion of job applicants from subsection (2) of 
the ADEA is noteworthy. . . . [I]t is a result dictated by the statute 
itself.”147 
The precedent set by Francis W. Parker School did not last, as the 
Supreme Court decision in Smith v. City of Jackson overruled it seven 
years later.148 Moreover, the majority decision in Francis W. Parker 
School may have contained a mistake stemming from the circuit court’s 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Griggs.149 Although the 
circuit court correctly notes that the language in Title VII protects 
applicants for employment, the court failed to distinguish between the 
language interpreted by Griggs—the pre-1972 language—and the current 
language of the statue after the 1972 amendment.150 
Two years later, the Eighth Circuit concluded that disparate impact 
claims are cognizable under the ADEA.151 In Smith v. City of Des 
Moines,152 the court was faced with a firefighter dismissed by the Des 
Moines Fire Department.153 The case did not directly deal with the 
question of whether or not applicants can make disparate impact claims. 
                                                     
145. Id. at 1076–77; Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
146. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077–78. 
147. Id. 
148. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1309 (11th Cir. 2015) (Vinson, J., 
dissenting), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 
2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017); see 
also supra section IV.B. 
149. En Banc Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 33, Villarreal, 839 F.3d 958 (en banc) (No. 15-
10602), 2016 WL 1376064. 
150. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077 (“Subsection (2) of Title VII’s prohibitions, which 
was the basis for the Supreme Court’s holding in Griggs . . . proscribes any actions by employers 
which ‘limit, segregate, or classify [their] employees or applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2) (emphasis added).”); see infra note 201 (1972 amendment added 
the language “or applicant for employment”); Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1296 n.5 (“This is the problem 
with dicta: when an issue is superfluous, even obvious errors escape notice.”). 
151. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 1468. 
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The court did, however, state in a footnote that “[s]ection 623(a)(2) of the 
ADEA governs employer conduct with respect to ‘employees’ only, while 
the parallel provision of Title VII protects ‘employees or applicants for 
employment.’”154 Accordingly, based on the Eighth Circuit dicta, 
applicants for employment are limited to relying on section 4(a)(1) of the 
ADEA, limiting litigants to disparate treatment claims.155 
In the same year, the Tenth Circuit also addressed the question of 
whether the ADEA covers disparate impact claims.156 In Ellis v. United 
Airlines, Inc.,157 two women who had applied for a job at United Airlines 
filed an ADEA claim challenging the airline’s weight requirements.158 
The plaintiffs argued that they were disparately impacted by the weight 
requirements because of their age.159 The court ultimately held that 
“ADEA claims cannot be based on a disparate impact theory of 
discrimination.”160 In a footnote, the court also stated, “[w]e do not dwell 
on Section 623(a)(2) because it does not appear to address refusals to hire 
at all.”161 Notably, however, in the same footnote, the court also 
recognized that “the Supreme Court applied language similar to 
§ 623(a)(2) in Title VII to job applicants in Griggs.”162 Like EEOC v. 
Francis Parker School, the precedent set by Ellis did not last long. The 
case was also overturned by the Smith decision.163 
Although all three circuits discussed the issue, none of the circuits 
directly ruled on the question of whether an applicant for employment 
qualifies under the ADEA. The Second and the Tenth Circuit Courts’ 
decisions were also overturned, undermining even the persuasiveness of 
their dicta. As of today, only one circuit has made a direct holding on the 
issue of whether applicants for employment can make disparate impact 
claims, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Co.164 
                                                     
154. Id. at 1470 n.2. 
155. Id.; see infra section II.B.  
156. Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996). 
157. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996). 
158. Id. at 1000. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1001. 
161. Id. at 1007 n.12. 
162. Id. 
163. Woods v. Boeing Co., 355 Fed. App’x 206, 214 n.4 (10th Cir. 2009). 
164. 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
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D. Villareal Forces the Courts to Directly Address Disparate Impact 
Claims for Applicants 
1. Factual Background 
Villarreal was first filed in the Northern District of Georgia in June 
2012.165 In the complaint, Richard M. Villarreal, a fifty-five year-old 
resident of Cumming, Georgia, claimed that the defendant, R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Company (R.J. Reynolds), used employment policies that “had 
a disparate impact on qualified applicants over the age of [forty], in 
violation of [the ADEA].”166 The case worked its way through the court 
system, culminating in an en banc decision by the Eleventh Circuit in 
October 2016.167 In a question of first impression,168 Villarreal forced the 
courts to directly answer whether applicants are covered under section 
4(a)(2) of the ADEA—the section allowing disparate impact claims. 
The underlying problem of the case began on November 8, 2007, when 
Mr. Villarreal applied for a position as a territory manager for R.J. 
Reynolds.169 He was forty-nine years old at the time he applied.170 R.J. 
Reynolds had provided guidelines to the company to be used when 
screening applications171 that included a description of a “target 
candidate” as someone “2–3 years out of college” who “adjusts easily to 
changes.”172 Additionally, the guidelines instructed the company to “stay 
away from” applicants who have been in “sales for 8–10 years.”173 Mr. 
Villarreal had over eight years of sales experience when he applied.174 R.J. 
Reynolds never contacted Mr. Villarreal, and he was not offered a 
territory manager position.175 
Over two years later, on May 17, 2010, Mr. Villarreal filed a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC alleging discrimination on the basis of 
                                                     
165. Complaint at 1, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 
823055 (Mar. 6, 2013), 2012 WL 5209709 [hereinafter “Complaint”]. 
166. Id. at 2–3. 
167. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961. 
168. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g 
en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292. 
169. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961; Complaint, supra note 165, at 6.  
170. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961. 
171. Id.  
172. Id. 
173. Id.; Complaint, supra note 165, at 7. 
174. Complaint, supra note 165, at 8. 
175. Id. at 6. 
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age.176 In April of 2012, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice.177 Only 
then did Mr. Villarreal file his lawsuit.178 
The Northern District of Georgia first ruled on the case on March 6, 
2013.179 In its decision, the court held that “disparate impact failure-to-
hire claims are not authorized under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.”180 In coming 
to this decision, the court noted “important textual difference[s]” between 
sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.181 Specifically, the court found 
it persuasive that unlike section 4(a)(1), section 4(a)(2) “does not mention 
hiring or prospective employees.”182 The district court cited Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence from Smith v. City of Jackson as supportive of 
this conclusion.183 Additionally, the district court pointed to the change in 
Title VII’s language from the 1972 amendments.184 Although Congress 
amended Title VII to include “or applicants for employment,” it did not 
amend the ADEA to state the same.185 The court interpreted this as a clear 
indication that Congress intentionally did not change the statute.186 
2. The Eleventh Circuit First Hears the Case 
In June 2014, Mr. Villarreal appealed his case to the Eleventh 
Circuit.187 The circuit court overruled the district court and held that 
                                                     
176. Id. at 12; Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2015), 
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), 
and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
177. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961; EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees 
/lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/9VP2-9QQV] (a person must file a charge with the EEOC, which will 
then issue a right-to-sue notice).  
178. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1291. 
179. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 823055, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800, and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958, aff’d and 
remanded, 839 F.3d 958, and aff’d No. 15-10602, 2017 WL 2781522 (11th Cir. June 27, 2017). 
180. Id. at *6. 
181. Id. at *5. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. (“Section 4(a)(2), of course, does not apply to ‘applicants for employment’ at all—it is 
only § 4(a)(1) that protects this group.” (quoting Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 266 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring))); see also supra note 139. 
184. Villarreal, 2013 WL 823055, at *5. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at *6 (“As the Supreme Court recognized in Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv.’s, 557 U.S. 167, 174 
(2009), . . . ‘[w]hen Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have 
acted intentionally’ . . . ‘[w]e cannot ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s relevant 
provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.’”). 
187. Notice of Appeal at 1, Villarreal, No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 823055 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 
18 - Pitsch.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2017  8:36 PM 
1626 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1605 
 
section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA does apply to disparate impact claims 
brought by job applicants.188 The court started by analyzing the language 
of the statute.189 Both Mr. Villarreal and R.J. Reynolds pointed to the 
language of section 4(a)(2) which switches between “his employees” and 
“any individual.”190 Mr. Villarreal argued that the term “any individual” 
broadly included applicants for employment.191 R.J. Reynolds, however, 
argued that the term “any individual” only relates back to the term “his 
employees.”192 The court concluded that the arguments by both parties 
were reasonable.193 The court held that the language was, therefore, 
ambiguous.194 However, the court analyzed the other arguments brought 
by Mr. Villarreal and R.J. Reynolds to “underscore [the point] that section 
4(a)(2) can reasonably be read in more than one way.”195 
First, the court discussed Mr. Villarreal’s argument that Griggs is 
instructive.196 The court recognized that the Supreme Court repeatedly 
referenced job applicants in Griggs, giving the circuit court the impression 
that it is reasonable to read the statute to include applicants for 
employment.197 
Next, the court dealt with the question of whether Congress 
purposefully chose not to amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII in 
1972 and 1991.198 Despite the fact that the statutes are codified in different 
laws, language in certain provisions of both statutes is nearly identical and 
mostly parallel.199 Courts, therefore, have often looked at Title VII when 
interpreting the ADEA.200 
                                                     
6, 2013). 
188. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g 
en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
189. Id. at 1292. 
190. Id. at 1293 (Mr. Villarreal “argues R.J. Reynolds ‘limited’ its ‘employees’ in a ‘way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive’ an ‘individual’ like him ‘of employment opportunities’ because of 
his age. R.J. Reynolds, in turn, directs us to the earlier term ‘his employees.’ It says the later reference 
to ‘any individual’ only includes these employees”). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id.  
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 1294. 
197. Id. at 1295. 
198. Id.  
199. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
200. Id. 
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In 1972, Congress amended Title VII.201 The amended language 
extended the section on unlawful employment practices to include 
“applicants for employment.”202 The 1972 change to Title VII “was part 
of a broad revamp of the statute aimed at expanding the jurisdiction and 
power of the EEOC.”203 Congress added the new language to reaffirm 
current law and expand the class of persons having standing, but Congress 
did “not intend[] to limit standing to the classes of persons specifically 
mentioned in the new statute.”204 The 1972 amendment has also been read 
to include the concept of disparate impact that had developed in Supreme 
Court rulings.205 In the debates for the amendments to Title VII, the House 
Committee referenced then recent case law stating:  
[An] example [of nonobvious discrimination] was provided by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., where the 
Court held that the use of employment tests as determinants of an 
applicant’s job qualification . . . was in violation of Title VII if 
the tests had a discriminatory effect.206  
Thus, the legislative history of Title VII reveals that the disparate impact 
theory of discrimination stemming from Griggs was also ratified in the 
1972 amendments.207 Congress was not in the process of amending, and 
did not amend, the ADEA in 1972 when considering the Title VII 
amendments.208 
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII again.209 This time, however, 
Congress enacted the amendment as a “response to ‘a number of recent 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court that sharply cut back on the 
scope and effectiveness of [civil rights] laws.’”210 Two Supreme Court 
cases were specifically affected by the new amendment: Price 
                                                     
201. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e). 
202. Id. 
203. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1295, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 
WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017); see also George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: 
The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 864 (1972). 
204. See supra Sape & Hart note 203, at 864. 
205. Katherine J. Thompson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972 – A 
Response to Gold, 8 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 105, 109 (1986). 
206. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 9 (1971)).  
207. Id. at 116; Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1295. 
208. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1295. 
209. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
210. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 185 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, p. 2 (1991), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1991, p. 694). 
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins211 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.212 In 
Price Waterhouse, the Court held that: 
[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender 
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the 
defendant may avoid a finding of liability . . . [by proving] that it 
would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the 
plaintiff’s gender into account.213  
The new amendment eliminated the affirmative defense created in Price 
Waterhouse.214 In Wards Cove, the Court held that “a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular 
employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack. 
Such a showing is an integral part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case in a 
disparate-impact suit under Title VII.”215 The amendment overturned 
Wards Cove by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes to 
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.216 During the 
same year, Congress made only minor amendments to the ADEA.217 
Neither the 1972 nor the 1991 amendments to Title VII were adopted 
into the ADEA.218 However, the Eleventh Circuit in Villarreal ultimately 
dismissed the importance of the Title VII amendments: 
Congress has all kinds of reasons for passing laws, and 
presumably all kinds of reasons for not passing laws as 
well . . . We will not assume that Congress chose not to pass 
legislation modifying the ADEA simply because it did make this 
one change in a broader restructuring of Title VII.219 
Third, the court dismissed the defendant’s arguments that Smith v. City 
of Jackson is binding.220 The court pointed out that the facts of Smith did 
not force the Supreme Court to answer the question of whether applicants 
for employment can make disparate impact claims, making the Smith 
                                                     
211. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
212. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
213. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
214. Gross, 557 U.S. at 185. 
215. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (emphasis added). 
216. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
217. Id. at 1079 (affecting the notice of limitations period). 
218. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174; Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th 
Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 
10, 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
219. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1296. 
220. Id. 
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opinion unhelpful.221 The majority therefore held that the concurrences 
from Smith, at most, show that R.J. Reynolds’s reading of the statute was 
reasonable.222 
Fourth, the court analyzed R.J. Reynolds’s argument that the court 
should look to other parts of the statute to define the terms in section 
4(a)(2).223 The court dismissed this argument, stating, “this interpretive 
canon does little to reveal whether Congress used the term ‘any 
individual’ to exclude job applicants or to include them.”224 Indeed, the 
court pointed out that Congress “knew how to use the more specific term 
‘employees’” but chose not to in this section.225 
Finally, the court dismissed Mr. Villarreal’s argument that the court 
should interpret the statute in a way that would fit the ADEA’s general 
purpose.226 Although the court recognized that the ADEA was enacted to 
allow claims regarding discriminatory hiring, the court found that the 
purpose of the statute did not illuminate the types of claim that would be 
allowed.227 Thus, the court declined to rule on the issue based on the 
ADEA’s general purpose.228 
Ultimately, the court found the language was ambiguous and deserved 
analysis under a different interpretive canon: agency deference.229 The 
court therefore looked to the EEOC’s interpretations of the ADEA.230 
Under the EEOC’s standard, “[section] 4(a)(2) protects any individual an 
employer discriminates against, regardless of whether that individual is 
an employee or job applicant.”231 Thus, while the court found the ADEA’s 
language was ambiguous, it found support for its holding that applicants 
for employment are allowed to make disparate impact claims through the 
EEOC’s interpretation. 
                                                     
221. Id. 
222. Id.; see Smith, 544 U.S. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that applicants for 
employment cannot make disparate impact claims). 
223. Villareal, 806 F.3d at 1297. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 1298. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 1293. 
230. Id. at 1299 (“When a statute is ambiguous, policy choices belong to the agency that enforces 
the statute.”). 
231. Id. 
18 - Pitsch.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2017  8:36 PM 
1630 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1605 
 
Judge Vinson dissented from the Eleventh Circuit decision.232 His 
opinion stated that the statute was not, in fact, ambiguous.233 Like the 
district court, the dissent placed emphasis on the differing language 
between sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2), noting that section 4(a)(2) “makes 
no reference to hiring decisions at all.”234 Ultimately, the dissent found 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Smith to be decisive on the issue.235 
3. Eleventh Circuit en banc 
In January 2016, R.J. Reynolds petitioned the court for a rehearing by 
the Eleventh Circuit, en banc.236 The Eleventh Circuit granted the appeal 
and affirmed the district court, thereby reversing the decision of the 
appeals court.237 The en banc panel concluded that the text of the ADEA 
does not allow an applicant for employment to make disparate impact 
claims because the applicant does not have “status as an employee.”238 
Like the first decision by the Eleventh Circuit, the en banc panel began by 
considering the text of the statute as well as the statutory context.239 The 
panel specifically looked at the meaning of “or otherwise.”240 The 
majority held that “[b]y using ‘or otherwise’ to join the verbs in this 
section, Congress made ‘depriv[ing] or tend[ing] to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities’ a subset of ‘adversely affect[ing] [the 
individual’s] status as an employee.’”241 Consequently, applicants are 
only protected from deprivation of employment opportunities if they 
already have status as an employee.242 The majority also bolsters its 
conclusion by stating that “‘status as an employee’ connotes a present 
fact.”243 
                                                     
232. Id. at 1306 (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
233. Id. at 1311. 
234. Id. at 1308–09. 
235. Id. at 1311. 
236. Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Villarreal, 806 F.3d 1288 (No. 15-10602).  
237. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 973 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
238. Id. at 961. 
239. Id. at 963. 
240. Id. (“Section 4(a)(2) of the Act makes it ‘unlawful for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s age.’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2))). 
241. Id. (alterations in original). 
242. Id. at 964. 
243. Id. 
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In a dissenting opinion,244 Judge Martin stated that section 4(a)(2) of 
the ADEA should be read as supporting Mr. Villarreal’s claim because 
“Mr. Villarreal is an ‘individual’ who was ‘deprive[d]’ ‘of employment 
opportunities’ and denied any ‘status as an employee’ because of 
something an employer did to ‘limit . . . his employees.’”245 The dissent 
focused on the variation in terminology between “his employees” and 
“any individual.”246 The opinion also noted that even the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that “when the word ‘employee’ lacks any temporal 
qualifier’ it can include people other than current employees.”247 
The majority panel also held that the statutory context of the section 
supported the district court’s decision.248 The panel pointed to section 
4(c)(2) of the ADEA, which contains language that parallels section 
4(a)(2).249 Unlike section 4(a)(2), however, section 4(c)(2) distinguishes 
between employees and applicants for employment.250 Based on this 
difference, the panel held that the term “‘employee’ does not encompass 
‘applicant for employment.’”251 And, “because ‘[a] word or phrase is 
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text,’” section 4(a)(2) 
does not encompass applicants for employment.252 
The dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on using other sections of 
the ADEA in deciding the question of whether applicants for employment 
can make disparate impact claims.253 The dissent pointed out that section 
4(c)(2) applies to labor organizations, rather than individual employees.254 
The opinion then indicated that the problem with cross-applying the rules 
regarding labor unions to section 4(a)(2) is that section 4(c)(2) targets “the 
unique way in which labor organizations can discriminate when they 
                                                     
244. Joined by Judge Wilson, Judge Jill Pryor, Judge Jordan and Judge Rosenbaum for Part II. 
245. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 982 (Martin, J., dissenting) (alternations in original). 
246. Id. (“This deliberate variation in terminology within the same sentence of a statute suggests 
that Congress did not interpret the two terms as being equivalent.” (citing United States v. Williams, 
340 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003))). 
247. Id. at 984 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997)). 
248. Id. at 966. 
249. Id.; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(2) (1967) (“It shall be 
unlawful for a labor organization . . . to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or 
fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of 
such individual’s age.”). 
250. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 623(c)(2). 
251. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 966. 
252. Id. (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 59, at 174). 
253. Id. at 984–85 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
254. Id. at 985. 
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‘refer’ ‘applicants’ to employers.”255 Unlike employers, labor unions are 
unique because of their referral roles.256 Section 4(c)(2) thus protects an 
employee who attempted to find work but was unable to because of a labor 
organization.257 The dissent therefore contended that “[i]t’s sometimes 
dangerous to infer what Congress meant in one part of a statute based on 
what it didn’t say in other parts.”258 
The majority did not find case law analysis necessary in this case. 
Instead, the majority described Mr. Villarreal’s use of case law as an 
attempt “to circumvent the plain meaning of the statue by citing decisions 
of the Supreme Court that interpret similar language in other statutes.”259 
The majority also found that Griggs was unhelpful because it was not a 
case brought by applicants, as Mr. Villarreal argued, but rather a case 
involving current employees.260 Cases that have interpreted Griggs as 
applying to applicants for employment were all decided after Congress 
added language about applicants to Title VII.261 
The dissent, however, concluded that the “Supreme Court has never 
limited Griggs as the majority suggests.”262 Although the plaintiffs in the 
Griggs case were current employees, the “employment requirements 
challenged in Griggs were used both for initial hiring as well as for those 
already employed.”263 The dissent therefore read the ADEA in the same 
way the Supreme Court read the identical Title VII language in Griggs.264 
Finally, the majority held that it would not defer to the EEOC’s 
interpretation when it did not find the language to be ambiguous.265 The 
majority stated that it would not interpret the word to have a “forced 
meaning”—an interpretation used to create ambiguity—therefore, relying 
on an agency’s interpretation is unnecessary.266 The dissent, however, 
                                                     
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. (“In other words, the statute protects someone who sought work but was denied status as 
an applicant—that is, being allowed to apply at all—due to labor organizations’ control of the hiring 
process.”). 
258. Id.  
259. Id. at 967. 
260. Id. at 968. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 986 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 970 (“Finally, Villarreal and the Commission urge us to defer to the Commission’s 
interpretation of the statute, but we do not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute when the 
text is clear.”). 
266. Id. 
18 - Pitsch.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2017  8:36 PM 
2017] QUICK, STOP HIRING OLD PEOPLE! 1633 
 
pointed out that there have been multiple interpretations of the language, 
and therefore deference to the agency’s interpretation is required.267 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Jordan agreed with the conclusion that 
Mr. Villarreal could not assert a disparate impact claim.268 However, the 
concurrence posed another interpretation of the statute.269 As an 
alternative to either the circuit court or the en banc panel’s decision, the 
concurrence proposed the following interpretation: 
A job applicant (“any individual”) can bring an ADEA claim 
under a disparate impact theory, but only if something the 
employer has done vis-à-vis “his employees” violates the ADEA 
by “limit[ing], segregat[ing] or classify[ing]” those employees. 
So, if an employer’s practice with respect to his employees 
violates the ADEA, and that same practice has a disparate impact 
on job applicants, those applicants can sue under § 623(a)(2).270 
In Mr. Villarreal’s case, he would not be able to recover because he did 
not challenge conduct by R.J. Reynolds that affected current 
employees.271 
4. Summary and Other Ongoing Litigation 
Overall, eleven judges analyzed Mr. Villarreal’s claim and 
interpretation of the ADEA: “[a]mong the eleven of us, we read the statute 
to mean at least three different things. While each of us feels certain about 
the correctness of our own reading, we can’t all be absolutely right.”272 
The issue of whether applicants for employment can make disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA has been far from clear cut. There is also 
ongoing litigation in another state disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
en banc holding.273 
Mr. Villarreal appealed his case to the Supreme Court but was denied 
certiorari.274 The issues and questions raised by the Eleventh Circuit and 
the en banc dissent questioning this result remain unanswered. 
Additionally, there is potential for a circuit split on this issue. In 2017, a 
                                                     
267. Id. at 988 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
268. Id. at 973 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 974. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 988 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
273. See Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 16-CV-02276-JST, 2017 WL 661354, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2017). 
274. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., __U.S.__, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
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California district court came to the opposite conclusion of the Eleventh 
Circuit in Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.275 The court held that 
applicants for employment are allowed to make disparate impact claims, 
stating “[t]he plain language of the statute supports the more inclusive 
interpretation.”276 Although Mr. Villarreal might have been denied 
certiorari, the issue is still relevant, and courts remain divided. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE ADEA 
AS ALLOWING APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT TO 
MAKE DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS 
The plaintiff in Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds petitioned for certiorari to 
have his case heard by the Supreme Court.277 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in June 2017.278 Regardless of this particular denial, the issue 
still lacks clarity, and when it inevitably comes before the Supreme Court 
again, the Court should interpret the statute as allowing applicants for 
employment to make disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 
A. The ADEA’s Text Is Ambiguous 
Like the Supreme Court, all courts should start with statutory analysis 
by looking at the text of the statute.279 Only if a statute is ambiguous can 
a court look to other methods of interpretation.280 In the case of section 
4(a)(2) of the ADEA, the text of the statute is ambiguous. The Eleventh 
Circuit en banc decision in Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds demonstrates the 
ambiguity of this statute. In that case, eleven judges found the statute to 
have three different meanings.281 Additionally, the case had gone before 
three other courts in which the judges each provided conflicting 
interpretations. 
Section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA contains the text at issue. This section 
states that “an employer may not limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
                                                     
275. No. 16-CV-02276-JST, 2017 WL 661354, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2017). 
276. Id. at *2. 
277. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Villarreal, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 16-971). 
278. Villarreal, 137 S. Ct. at 2292. 
279. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292; Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). 
280. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963–70. 
281. Id. at 988 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
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status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.”282 The problem 
with courts resting on the plain meaning of the statute is that Congress 
used multiple terms in discussing what “person” the statute affects. First, 
the statute uses the term “his employees,” but it then switches to “any 
individual” before going back to “his status as an employee.” Because 
courts take seriously Congress’s intentional choice to use different 
language,283 it is apparent that the section is not limited to current 
employees, as “any individual” would indicate a group larger than current 
employees. However, in another section of the statute addressing labor 
unions, Congress chose to clarify that the section specifically applies to 
applicants for employment.284 This creates confusion as to whether 
Congress used the broad term “any individual” to exclude job applicants 
or include them.285 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit en banc opinion 
held that the use of the term “or otherwise” connects the verbs in the 
sentence, only allowing an individual protection if he has status as an 
employee.286 The judges in both the majority and the dissent then point to 
the Dictionary Act,287 which says that “unless the context indicates 
otherwise . . . words used in the present tense include the future as well as 
the present.”288 While the dissent argues that the status of an employee 
can include those applying for status as an employee,289 the majority states 
that “status” in this sentence is not a verb and therefore the Dictionary Act 
would not apply.290 
Both the majority and dissent are reasonable in their interpretation of 
the statute.291 Because of this, the Supreme Court should find the language 
                                                     
282. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1967). 
283. See supra note 68. 
284. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 623(c)(2) (“[T]o limit, segregate, or classify its 
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant 
for employment, because of such individual’s age.”). 
285. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g 
en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
286. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963. 
287. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
288.  Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 983 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 965. 
291. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015) (arguing that 
both the readings by the defendant and the plaintiff of the plain language of the ADEA seemed 
reasonable), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 
10, 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
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to be ambiguous and look to other methods of statutory interpretation in 
order to resolve the issue.292 
B. The ADEA’s Case Law and Legislative History Are Unhelpful 
Just as the analysis of the plain meaning alone is inconclusive, the case 
law and legislative history of the ADEA leading up to Villarreal are 
unhelpful in analyzing the current question. Regarding the case law, only 
three other circuits have discussed whether applicants for employment 
could be protected under the disparate impact section.293 Despite various 
dicta, none of the courts directly held on the issue.294 The Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Griggs and Smith face the same problem. While Griggs 
clearly allowed disparate impact claims under Title VII, courts are still 
unsure what group of persons are covered by the decision.295 Some courts 
have held that Griggs covered both employees and applicants for 
employment, while a few courts still hold otherwise.296 Regardless, the 
Griggs decision addressed a Title VII claim, and Title VII was amended 
to include applicants for employment after the case was decided, arguably 
coloring any future interpretations of the case. Although Smith addressed 
the ADEA, it did not answer the question of whether applicants for 
employment are covered by section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.297 
The legislative history of the ADEA and Title VII also do little to 
instruct the Court on how to decide the issue. The ADEA was created in 
the wake of Title VII’s inception.298 Because of this, many courts look to 
the history of Title VII to understand the ADEA. This, however, has 
proven fruitless in answering the question of whether applicants for 
employment can make disparate impact claims because of the varying 
legislative histories between the two amendments. For instance, Title VII 
was amended in 1972 and 1991, but each amendment was in direct 
response to Title VII specific case law. It is therefore logical that Congress 
did not amend the ADEA because the case law at the time was not dealing 
with that statute. Thus, the idea that Congress intentionally did not amend 
                                                     
292. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 706 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Deference is appropriate where the relevant language, carefully considered, can yield more than one 
reasonable interpretation.”). 
293. See supra section IV.C. 
294. Id. 
295. See supra section IV.A; Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1294. 
296. See supra section IV.A. 
297. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
298. See supra note 5. 
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the ADEA ignores a key fact about the histories of Title VII and the 
ADEA. Additionally, Congress did not even consider the ADEA during 
the 1972 amendment.299 Congress’s inaction at that time is therefore 
inconclusive when deciding whether Congress purposefully did not 
amend ADEA.300 
C. The Court Should Defer to the Agency in Charge of Enforcement 
The Supreme Court has continuously recognized the considerable 
weight an agency interpretation should be accorded when entrusted to 
administer a regulatory scheme.301 In order to analyze an agency’s 
interpretation, the Supreme Court set up a two-step framework. First, a 
court must ask whether the statute is ambiguous.302 If the statute is “silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”303 Stated differently, if Congress did not clearly state its 
intent, the court should look to a reasonable agency interpretation.304 
Because the ADEA grants the EEOC authority to issue rules and 
regulations needed to carry out the statute, and the statute is ambiguous, 
it is “an absolutely classic case for deference to agency interpretation.”305 
Under the EEOC’s interpretation, there is no distinction between 
prospective and current employees.306 Instead, the EEOC regulation on 
the ADEA states, “[a]ny employment practice that adversely affects 
individuals within the protected age group on the basis of older age is 
discriminatory unless the practice is justified by a ‘reasonable factor other 
                                                     
299. Id. 
300. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969) (“Congressional inaction frequently betokens 
unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis. ‘It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence 
alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.’” (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 
(1946))). 
301. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389 (1984); Blum 
v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976); Inv. Co. Inst. 
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1971); Unemp’t Comp. Comm’n v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 153–54 
(1946); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 
480–81 (1921); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342 (1896); Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 
570–71 (1884); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877); Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. 
206, 210 (1827). 
302. King v. Burwell, __U.S.__, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015). 
303. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
304. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488. 
305. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
306. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g 
en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
18 - Pitsch.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2017  8:36 PM 
1638 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1605 
 
than age.’”307 The EEOC’s statement, which accompanied the publication 
of the agency’s final interpretation regarding the ADEA, clarified the 
regulation: “[p]aragraph (d) of § 1625.7 has been rewritten to make it clear 
that employment criteria that are age-neutral on their face but which 
nevertheless have a disparate impact on members of the protected age 
group must be justified as a business necessity.”308 Therefore, any 
individual within the protected age group is able to make a disparate 
impact claim.309 
Deferring to the agency’s interpretation also has the secondary benefit 
of more accurately reflecting the purpose of the ADEA. In the statute, 
Congress wrote that the “purpose of this chapter [is] to promote 
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers 
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment.”310 The EEOC interpretation encourages employers 
not to utilize policies that negatively impact the hiring of older applicants. 
Thus, by following the EEOC interpretation, the Supreme Court would 
further the goals of the statute: to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination as 
well as to limit the number of arbitrarily jobless older persons.311 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s first 
interpretation and hold that the ADEA does cover applicants for 
employment in disparate impact claims. Although case law is 
inconclusive, the EEOC has interpreted the statute as covering plaintiffs 
like Mr. Villarreal. The Supreme Court should recognize this 
interpretation.312 This interpretation will also bring the courts into 
                                                     
307. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (2012). 
308. Final Interpretations: Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 46 Fed. Reg. 47724-01 
(1981). 
309. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239–40 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“Department of 
Labor, which initially drafted the legislation, and the EEOC, which is the agency charged by Congress 
with responsibility for implementing the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 628, have consistently interpreted the 
ADEA to authorize relief on a disparate-impact theory . . . . See also § 1625.7 (2004) (setting forth 
the standards for a disparate-impact claim).”). 
310. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1967). 
311. Id. (“[T]he purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their 
ability rather than age.”). 
312. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7. 
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alignment with the purpose of the statute: to inhibit employers from 
arbitrarily discriminating against older persons.313 
In addition, Congress should amend the ADEA to expressly include 
applicants for employment.314 The fact that Title VII was amended in 
response to case law supports the argument that Congress must now 
similarly clarify the ADEA.315 Additionally, because courts have 
struggled with the interpretation, a Congressional amendment would ease 
the burden on the courts, which would no longer have to grapple with a 
convoluted statutory analysis. Congress’s amendment could be as easy as 
adding the language “or applicants for employment” after “to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees.”316 This addition would bring the 
language of the ADEA in line with Title VII, which was amended to add 
that language—in the portion of Title VII that is identical to the ADEA—
in 1972.317 Additionally, such a change would be unlikely to significantly 
affect businesses’ hiring practices, as employers would still have access 
to the broad exceptions set forth in the RFOA sections of the ADEA.318 
But it would bring the ADEA in line with its stated purpose: to prohibit 
discrimination.319 
 
                                                     
313. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 621. 
314. If the intention behind certain language of a statute is unclear, it is up to Congress to rewrite 
the statute to create clarity, not the courts. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010) (“It is 
not for [the Court] to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve 
what we think Congress really intended.”).  
315. See supra section IV.D. 
316. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 623. 
317. See supra note 201. 
318. See supra section II.B. 
319. Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 621. 
